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1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile	 networks	 have	 significant	 applications	 in	 the	
defence	 arena.	With	 the	 move	 towards	 the	 network	 centric	
warfare, the information technology is expected to provide 
force multiplication effect to the military commanders in 
the	 future	 battlefield	 scenario.	 It	 also	 provides	 services	 on	
demand to the various echelons of the defence forces. Though 
an umpteen number of ad hoc networking protocols were 
developed,	analyzed,	simulated,	and	benchmarked	over	the	last	
decade, lack of realism in a real application scenario is one of 
the	reasons	for	 the	 insufficient	deployment	of	mobile	ad	hoc	
network	(MANET)	in	military	communications.
In addition, these networks are confronted by many types 
of	 attacks	 like	 passive	 eavesdropping,	 active	 modification	
of messages, and disruption of service, replay attacks and 
impersonation attacks1,2. The resource constraint environment 
poses a great challenge to the implementation of cryptographic 
security schemes in an ad hoc scenario due to their computational 
complexity. Additionally, a legitimate ad hoc node may behave 
maliciously due to compromise and remain undetected in the 
network. At a later time, these nodes may launch denial-of-
service attacks. The cryptographic schemes fail to detect these 
nodes whereas the trust based security schemes easily identify 
these behavioural anomalies by monitoring the neighbours 
periodically.
In wireless applications, the satisfaction of the clients is 
achieved by successful message delivery with minimal delay. 
The average satisfaction level of the clients in a wireless ad hoc 
network is computed by aggregating the individual satisfaction 
levels	of	each	of	these	clients.	Some	of	the	clients	are	victimized	
by malicious neighbours, thereby depriving them of their 
network resources. These behaviours are not accounted in the 
outcome. The trust and reputation schemes play a major role 
in identifying such functional misbehaviours of participating 
entities in the network. 
Trust	 is	 defined	 as	 the	 assured	 reliance	 on	 the	 ability	
and	 truthfulness	 of	 another	 entity	 over	 a	 specific	 behaviour	
or	action.	 It	 is	 subjective	 in	nature,	depending	on	 the	node’s	
independent evaluations about other neighbouring nodes. In an 
ad hoc network, this process is done by continuous monitoring 
mechanisms. This dynamic real time view of trust will result 
in	 a	 more	 flexible	 model	 that	 resembles	 the	 social	 trust	
relations in humans. The positive outcomes of interactions will 
increase the trust, while negative outcomes lower the trust of a 
neighbouring entity.
The	 proposed	 vector	 auto	 regression	 (VAR)	 based	
trust model is an econometric statistical model where an ad 
hoc node adopts a node centric approach3, but without any 
recommendation trust and depends on its own observations 
for evaluating a neighbour. The novelty in proposed model is 
the presence of trust metrics by which the behaviour of the 
neighbouring entity is captured through promiscuous listening. 
A vector of trust metrics is used to evaluate every action of the 
neighbouring node and its inter-relationship wrt time. Another 
unique feature in proposed trust model is that neighbours 
indulging in more than one type of security attack can be easily 
detected	by	the	regression	co-relation	coefficients.	
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
A vector auto regression-based trust model to predict the • 
malicious activities of the neighbour in an ad hoc network 
is proposed.
The proposed trust model is implemented over ad hoc • 
on-demand distance vector protocol and optimised link 
state routing protocol in a wireless ad hoc testbed. The 
feasibility of incorporating a trust model over ad hoc 
routing protocols is also practically demonstrated.
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The performance of the VAR trust model is compared • 
with existing trust models and it was shown that the 
proposed model has capabilities to identify malicious 
nodes launching multiple attacks.
2. RELATED WORKS
The	 MANET	 research	 is	 focused	 on	 development	 of	
multi-hop wireless ad hoc network protocols and plenty 
of simulation analysis is performed on security issues as 
well3-9. For large-scale deployment of ad hoc networks, 
their performance with the security add-ons has to be tested 
in real time environment10,11 and this may unfold many 
implementation issues.
The trust mechanism in each deployed mobile node 
should be capable of identifying a broad range of security 
attacks. In practical defence applications, an attacker node 
may launch multiple security attacks against its neighbour and 
the existing statistical trust models3-5 have limited capabilities 
and does not provide a comprehensive framework to capture 
all behavioural and functional aspects of these neighbouring 
entities. The moving average model is predominantly used 
in literature3-5,12 to compute the trust of a neighbouring node. 
These models evaluate trust as a single variable which does not 
truly	reflect	 the	multiple	dimensions	and	behavioural	aspects	
of	neighbour’s	trust.	
Security protocols employing cryptographic schemes 
are considered as hard security measures. Typical examples 
of such schemes, tailor-made for wireless sensor network 
(WSN)	 are	 SNEP13,	 µTESLA13 and	 LEAP14.	 SNEP	 offers	
data	 confidentiality,	 authentication	 and	 data	 freshness	 while	
µTESLA	offers	broadcast	authentication.	An	agent	based	trust	
scheme15	for	WSN	employs	recommendation	trust,	similar	to	
the trust based recommender system in tactical combat16. But, 
additional cryptographic message exchange overheads are 
incurred in the routing process. 
All the above mentioned schemes fail to detect legitimate 
authorised nodes that misbehave due to compromise. The trust 
based	 security	 schemes	 offer	 soft	 security	where	 authorized	
compromised nodes behaving maliciously over a period of 
time are detected easily by continuously monitoring their 
trustworthiness.	 Centralized	 trust	 schemes17 aggregate the 
trust of individual nodes in a central server which evaluates 
the trust decisions of the participating nodes in the network. 
Such	 schemes	 are	 not	 suitable	 for	MANETs	 since	 they	 lack	
centralized	infrastructure.	The	proposed	trust	model	is	a	node-
centric approach which captures every functional aspect of 
the neighbouring nodes for ensuring complete security in 
MANETs.	
 
3. VAR TRUST MODEL 
The VAR is commonly used as a prediction tool in 
forecasting systems of interrelated time series. In the proposed 
work, the individual functional behaviour of a neighbouring 
entity is modelled as a single time series and it is termed as 
trust metric. A non-exhaustive list of trust metrics possible 
for proactive and reactive routing is shown in Table 1. These 
trust metrics depend on past values of themselves and the past 
values of other trust metrics for a neighbour node. Hence, 
the trust metrics are represented as endogenous variables. To 
detect multiple attacks launched by neighbours, it is necessary 
to take into account the interdependence between these time 
series. Hence, the VAR model is used which is a dynamic 
multi-equation system and a very useful tool in the analysis of 
interrelationships between the different time series18. 
Every	node	in	the	proposed	model	is	entirely	responsible	
for	its	trust	decisions.	The	neighbour’s	trust	is	estimated	using	
a	VAR	 equation.	Each	 vector	 entity	 indicates	 a	 trust	metric.	
The	 neighbour’s	 behaviour	 is	 captured	 in	 these	 individual	
vector	 trust	metrics.	Let	n be the number of trust metrics to 
be evaluated. These metrics are represented as individual 
time series in the VAR model. In real network deployments, 
a malicious neighbour may launch multiple security attacks to 
create extensive damage to network resources. The proposed 
model	 aims	 to	 analyze	 the	 interrelationships	 between	 these	
trust metrics, thereby detecting multiple attacks launched by 
malicious neighbours at different instants of time.
The estimated trust vector of a neighbouring node y at time 
t is modelled as a VAR equation18	and	is	given	by	Eqn	(1).
Parameter Proactive routing Reactive routing
T[1] Number of TC messages received Number	of	RREQs	successfully forwarded
T[2] Number of TC messages forwarded by neighbour
Number	of	RREQs	received	
from the neighbouring node
T[3]
Number of occurrences showing 
the neighbour willingness to 
participate in data communication
Number	of	RREPs	received	
from the neighbour
T[4] Number of occurrences the 
neighbour	is	chosen	as	an	MPR
Time taken to respond to a 
RREQ	message.
T[5] Number of DATA packets successfully forwarded by neighbour
T[6] Number of DATA packets received from the neighbour
T[7] Number of ACKs forwarded by the neighbour
T[8]
T[9]
Number of ACKs received from the neighbour
Number	of	DATA	packets	forwarded	without	content	modification
Table 1. Generalised trust metrics for ad hoc routing
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																																	(1)
where		is	the	estimated	trust	metrics	vector	of	size	n, 
Ri	is	a	regression	coefficient	matrix	of	size	[n × n],  denotes 
the	error	vector	of	size	n and p is the time lag. The regression 
coefficients	 are	 determined	 by	 ordinary	 least	 square	 (OLS)	
estimates	 technique.	 These	 coefficients	 play	 a	 major	 role	
evaluating	 the	 neighbour’s	 trustworthiness,	 especially,	 when	
more than one type of attack is launched by the neighbour. 
They also indicate the correlation between the different trust 
metrics of the neighbouring node and their past time-lagged 
values.	The	OLS	equation	for	a	trust	metric,	say	T[1]	for	a	time	
lag of 2 at time t	is	represented	by	Eqn	(2).
		(2)
Similarly, the VAR equation for the other trust metrics can 
be	represented	as	shown	in	Eqn	(2)	where	R’ and R’’ are the 
regression	coefficient	matrices	in	the	first	and	second	time	lag	
respectively. 
The estimated trust is normalised in the interval Lmax 
and Lmin. The normalised
19 trust for a neighbouring node y is 
computed	from	the	vector	equation	as	shown	in	Eqn	(3).
																	(3)
where Tc denotes the estimated trust vector, Tmax and Tmin 
are design parameters represented as vectors representing the 
maximum and minimum possible trust value. For example, 
Tmax  can be 0.9, taking into consideration the unreliable wireless 
links in an ad hoc environment and Tmin can be –1 representing 
malicious behaviour. Lmax is the upper bound on the trust range 
(+1)	and	Lmin	is	the	lower	bound	on	the	trust	range	(–1).	
The	confidence	interval19 of mean for the estimated trust 
is computed to determine the accuracy of the trust estimations. 
The	standard	confidence	error		for	a	single	trust	metric,	about	
the	mean	is	computed	by	Eqn	(4).
																																		(4)
where t denotes the critical value obtained from the 
standard t-distribution	for	the	95	per	cent	confidence	interval,	
j	 specifies	 the	sample	size	and	  denotes the mean value. It 
indicates the standard error of the mean multiplied by the 
critical value of t. The standard error is obtained by calculating 
the standard deviation of the data set over square root of the 
sample	size.	
The estimated trust is computed using the VAR model for 
each of the neighbouring nodes. A neighbour with a high trust 
value is chosen for data forwarding.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP AND 
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The proposed work is carried out in an ad hoc testbed 
with	fifteen	 laptops	 in	an	 indoor	environment.	The	hardware	
comprises	 of	 Compaq	 6510b	 laptops	 running	 Linux	 Mint	
version	10	and	kernel	2.6.35.10	having	Netfilter	support	and	
equipped	with	 Intel	PRO/Wireless	 3945ABG.	These	devices	
serve as ad hoc nodes in indoor/outdoor environment. The 
AODV	and	OLSR	versions,	aodv-uu-0.9.6	and	olsrd-0.9.6,	from	
Uppasala University20 serve as the default protocol versions. 
The	 customized	 trust	 modules	 are	 built	 over	 these	 default	
versions. The testbed for GUI based monitoring is developed 
using Python wxgtk-2.8. Front end interfaces are used to give 
instructions to the volunteers performing the test-runs in the 
testbed	and	initialize	the	node	configuration	parameters,	time	
synchronization	 and	 the	 protocol	 specific	 parameters.	At	 the	
end of the experiment, the logs from individual machines are 
uploaded to a central system and aggregation charts are prepared 
for the following performance metrics like throughput, delay, 
etc.	 Table	 2	 lists	 the	 experimental	 setup	 and	 configuration	
parameters for the testruns. The VAR time lag parameter (p)	is	
chosen	as	2	based	on	the	Akaike’s	Information	Criterion19. 
Parameter Value
Experimental	area 600 × 600 m2
Maximum	node	speed	 20 m/s
Transmission	range	(indoor) 70	m	(approx)
Number of nodes 15
Data	packet	size 50 bits
Duration of experiment 30 min 
Channel data rate 11	Mbps
VAR time lag (p) 2
Number of trust metrics evaluated 8
Table 2. Experimental setup parameters
4.1 Performance of AODV 
The laptops participating in the ad hoc testbed are 
configured	 before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 experimentation	 through	
the python based GUI. Before the ad hoc network initiation, 
the	participating	nodes	are	synchronized	in	time.	The	AODV	
daemon is executed in each of these laptops. Raw data packets 
are transferred from a source to a destination using hping3 and 
monitored	using	tshark	files.
Figure 1 shows the throughput performance of the 
network at different source data rates in the presence of 40 per 
cent	blackhole	and	greyhole	nodes.	It	is	seen	that	the	AODV	
with trust offers 76 per cent throughput in the presence of 
40 per cent blackhole and greyhole nodes. The ad hoc nodes 
monitor their neighbours and accordingly chose a best trusted 
neighbour for forwarding their data. The loss of 25 per cent 
in	trusted	AODV	is	due	to	the	time	taken	by	the	neighbouring	
nodes to learn about the malicious behaviour of its neighbour. 
The	average	end-to-end	delay	of	AODV	with	trust	is	more	than	
default	AODV	by	0.1ms	as	shown	in	Fig.	2.	This	is	the	overhead	
associated with the trust computation algorithm. Figure 3 shows 
the throughput varying the number of malicious nodes which 
launch	flooding	attack.	The	source	is	sending	data	at	a	rate	of	
15	packets/s	and	the	malicious	nodes	are	made	to	send	RREQ	
packets to unknown destinations at 5 packets/s. The VAR trust 
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Figure 1. Comparison of the throughput by varying the source data transmission 
rate amidst 40 per cent blackhole (BH) nodes and 40 per cent greyhole 
(GH) nodes for the default protocols and customised VAR trust based 
routing protocols.
Figure 2. Comparison of end-to-end packet delay experienced by the packets in 
default and VAR trust-based routing protocols at different source data 
rates.
Figure 3. Comparison of the throughput against number of malicious nodes indulged 
in flooding attacks in the ad hoc testbed of 15 nodes.
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model is able to easily identify these malicious behaviours and 
the data packets are effectively rerouted through trustworthy 
neighbours.
4.2 Performance of OLSR 
The	OLSR	daemon	is	executed	in	the	laptops	participating	
in the ad hoc network. Through the front end interface, the 
laptops	are	configured	for	experimentation	as	specified	in	Table	
2. Figure 1 shows the throughput of the network at various data 
rates	in	the	presence	of	40	per	cent	malicious	nodes.	The	OLSR	
with trust maintains the throughput at 75 per cent. Figure 2 
shows the end-to-end delay experienced by the data packets in 
the	network.	The	average	end-to-end	delay	in	OLSR	with	trust	
is	slightly	higher	than	that	of	default	OLSR	by	0.09	ms.	
4.3 Performance of the VAR Trust Model 
The authors simulate the VAR trust model using the 
OPNET	 simulator	 and	 compare	 the	 proposed	 model	 with	
SRAC4	and	SLSP8	with	SMT9 by various performance metrics. 
Table 3 lists the security attacks addressed by VAR model and 
SRAC in a reactive ad hoc routing scenario. Table 4 shows the 
false alarm rates for various trust models. It can be clearly seen 
that VAR model is able to quickly detect malicious nodes and 
the false alarm rates are minimal when compared to SRAC and 
SLSP/SMT.	
Figure 4 shows the simulation results of trust overheads in 
computational time units for various trust models. SRAC incurs 
the maximum overhead due to the execution of encryption 
and	 decryption	 algorithms.	 This	 is	 especially	 significant	 in	
networks with high levels of mobility. It is shown that the 
overhead of SRAC is three times that of the VAR model for 
node	speeds	higher	than	20	m/s.	In	SLSP,	the	overhead	is	due	
to securing the links and is approximately two times higher 
than the overheads in the VAR model. This is due to the use of 
the digital signature and authentication using hash chains. 
The average time taken to detect a malicious neighbour 
in an ad hoc network is shown by the simulation results in Fig. 
5. The simulation setup consists of 50 nodes spread over an 
area of 1000 m2.	Malicious	 nodes	 include	 black	 holes,	 grey	
holes	 and	 those	 indulging	 in	 flooding	 attacks	 and	 content	
modification	 attacks.	 These	 nodes	 are	 capable	 of	 launching	
multiple attacks at different time intervals. They constitute 40 
per cent of the nodes in the network. It was found that VAR 
model is able to identify these attacks in 4.18 ms when the 
maximum node speed is 10 m/s. SRAC takes around 6 ms and 
this is due to the fact that the trust evaluations are based on one 
Security attacks VAR trust metrics SRAC
Dropping of control and data 
packets
T[1], T[2], T[5], 
T[6], T[7], T[8]
Detected indirectly by unsuccessful 
transmission counts of routing and data 
packets
Flooding the victim node with 
control and data packets T[1], T[6], T[8] Not detected
Non-cooperation in routing T[1], T[2], T[3], T[4]
Detected by unsuccessful transmission 
counts of routing packets
Modification	of	messages	by	
tampering with header/data T[5], T[9]
All messages are encrypted. Header 
modifications	are	detected	by	
unsuccessful transmission counts by 
the	sender.	Data	packet	modifications	
are not detected
Advertisement of false routes T[3], T[4] Detected by unsuccessful transmission counts of routing packets
Misrouting	the	data	packets T[5], T[9] Perceived as loss of data packets
False alarms Node 
speed 
(m/s)
VAR
(ms)
SRAC
(ms)
SLSP / SMT
(ms)
False positive rate
5 0.13 0.22 0.18
10 0.17 0.21 0.19
15 0.17 0.22 0.21
20 0.19 0.25 0.22
False negative rate
5 0.15 0.21 0.22
10 0.16 0.23 0.21
15 0.18 0.23 0.22
20 0.18 0.26 0.24
Table 3. Handling security attacks in VAR and SRAC trust models
Table 4. Performance comparison with existing trust models
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malicious activity, namely, non-forwarding of packets. Also, 
SRAC	is	unable	to	detect	flooding	attacks	in	the	network.	SLSP	
combined	with	SMT	ensures	 secure	 link	 updates	 and	 robust	
data transfer via redundant message transmissions. It is able to 
detect few attacks like masquerading, due to neighbour lookup 
protocol’s	duplicate	MAC	address	detection	functionality.	But,	
it fails to detect legitimate nodes that behave maliciously by 
launching multiple attacks at different intervals of time. 
The space complexity of the VAR based trust is estimated 
to	be	O(kn3)	where	k is the number of sample data collected 
for trust analysis and n is the number of trust metrics to be 
evaluated.
5. CONCLUSIONS
A regression based trust model is implemented in a 
proactive and a reactive routing protocol and tested it over an ad 
hoc	testbed.	It	was	found	that	both	AODV	and	OLSR	fortified	
with the trust model show a throughput of at least 75 per cent 
amidst 40 per cent compromised nodes with the end-to-end 
packet delay higher by 0.1msec than the default protocols. It is 
shown	that	a	generalized	trust	model	can	be	easily	incorporated	
over proactive and reactive ad hoc routing protocols and its 
performance can be studied in a realistic wireless scenario. The 
VAR trust model is able to identify multiple security attacks 
and performs better compared to the existing trust models. 
Some of the future extensions to be pursued are the inclusion 
of	recommendation	trust	and	confidence	parameter	in	the	VAR	
trust	model.	Other	interesting	extensions	include	studying	the	
overheads associated with the information exchange in the 
network due to propagation of trust, incorporation of other 
security attacks into the VAR trust model. The performance 
of this trust model over other ad hoc routing protocols and 
scalability issues concerned with the large scale deployment of 
ad	hoc	nodes	in	application	specific	scenarios	are	other	areas	
to be pursued. Integration of trust based cognitive approaches 
to theoretical models in wireless security is also planned to be 
investigated in future. 
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